Complexity of life forms on Earth has increased tremendously, primarily driven by sub-14 sequent evolutionary transitions in individuality, a mechanism in which units formerly 15 being capable of independent replication combine to form higher-level evolutionary units. 16 Although this process has been likened to the recursive combination of pre-adapted sub-17 solutions in the framework of learning theory, no general mathematical formalization of 18 this analogy has been provided yet. Here we show, building on former results connecting 19 replicator dynamics and Bayesian update, that (i) evolution of a hierarchical population 20 under multilevel selection is equivalent to Bayesian inference in hierarchical Bayesian 21 models, and (ii) evolutionary transitions in individuality, driven by synergistic fitness 22 interactions, is equivalent to learning the structure of hierarchical models via Bayesian 23 model comparison. These correspondences support a learning theory oriented narrative 24 of evolutionary complexification: the complexity and depth of the hierarchical structure 25 of individuality mirrors the amount and complexity of data that has been integrated 26 about the environment through the course of evolutionary history. 27 1 Keywords: Evolution, multilevel selection, major evolutionary transitions, Bayesian 28 models, structure learning, graphical models 29 1 Introduction 30
tic generative models complements recent efforts of searching for algorithmic analogies 71 between emergent evolutionary phenomena and neural network based learning models 72 [15, 16] . These include correspondences between evolutionary-ecological dynamics and 73 autoassociative networks [17] and also linking the evolution of developmental organiza-74 tion to learning in artificial neural networks [18] . As such connectionist models account 75 for how global self-organizing learning behavior might emerge from simple local rules 76 (e.g., weight updates), our approach aims at providing a common global framework for 77 modeling both evolutionary and learning dynamics. 78 In the following, we provide a brief introduction to the elementary building blocks 79 of our arguments: Bayesian update and replicator dynamics. Bayesian update [19] fits 80 a probability distribution P (I) of hypotheses I = I 1 , . . . , I m to the data e. It does so 81 by integrating prior knowledge about the probability P (I i ) of hypothesis I i with the 82 likelihood that the actual data e = e(t) is being generated by hypothesis I i , given by 83 P (e(t)|I i ). Mathematically, the fitted distribution P (I i |e(t)), called the posterior, is 84 simply proportional to both the prior P (I i ) and the likelihood P (e(t)|I i ): 85 P (I i |e(t)) = P (e(t)|I i )P (I i ) i P (e(t)|I i )P (I i )
On the other hand, the discrete replicator equation [20] that accounts for the change 86 in relative abundance f (I i ) of types of replicating individuals I i in the population driven 87 by their fitness values w(I i ), reads as
.
( time t corresponds to the prior probability P (I i ); the relative abundance f (I i ; t + 1) at 91 time t + 1 is corresponding to the posterior probability P (I i |e(t)); the fitness w(I i ; t) 92 of type I i at time t is corresponding to the likelihood P (e(t)|I i ); and the average fitness 93 i w(I i ; t)f (I i ; t) is corresponding to the normalizing factor i P (e(t)|I i )P (I i ) called the 94 model evidence.
95
Building on this observation, a natural question to ask is if this mathematical equiv-96 alence is only an apparent similarity due to the simplicity of both models, or it is a 97 consequence of a deeper structural analogy between evolutionary and learning dynamics.
98
We propose two conceptually new avenues along which this equivalence can be gener-99 alized. First, we identify concepts of hierarchical evolutionary processes with concepts 100 of (i) multivariate probability theory, (ii) Bayesian inference in hierarchical models and of belonging to a collective, but the collectives themselves do not possess any heritable 135 information; (ii) selection in which collectives possess their own heritable information but 136 also the individuals in them might replicate at different rates; (iii) and selection in which 137 individuals have already lost their ability to replicate independently, therefore, their fit-138 ness is totally determined by the collective they belong to. As Michod and Nedelcu 139 write on p. 61 of Ref.
[24], "group fitness is, initially, taken to be the average of the 140 lower-level individual fitnesses; but as the evolutionary transition proceeds, group fitness 141 becomes decoupled from the fitness of its lower-level components". This, as we shall see,
142
is exactly what our model accounts for mathematically, incorporating also the effect of 143 stochastically varying environment.
144
A key assumption that enables the machinery of multivariate probability theory 145 to work is that abundance of collectives is measured in terms of abundance of indi-146 viduals they contain. Indeed, by identifying the abundance of individuals of type I i ,
, that are part of collectives of type C 1 j that are themselves part 148 of collectives of type C 2 k , etc., with the joint probabilities P (I i , C 1 j , C 2 k , . . . ), two important Figure 1 : Evolution of multilevel population as inference in Bayesian belief network. The stochastic environment e governs the evolutionary dynamics of multilevel population composition f (I i in C 1 j in C 2 k ). This is, in turn, equivalent to successive Bayesian inference of hidden variables I, C 1 and C 2 based on the observation of current the environmental parameters e. Since these environmental parameters are sampled and observed multiple times (i.e., at every timestep t = 1, 2, 3 . . . ), the corresponding node of the belief network is conventionally placed on a plate. Also note that the deletion of links between nodes of the belief network is corresponding to conditional independence relations between variables in the Bayesian setting and to specific structural properties of selection and population composition in the evolutionary setting; see text for details. 
relative abundances of units at a given level, e.g., of collectives at level C 1 ,
probabilities, e.g.,
properties of multilevel selection conditional independence of the observed variable e and a latent variable, e.g., I, P (e|I, C 1 , C 2 , . . . ) = P (e|C 1 , C 2 , . . . ) units at a given level, e.g., individuals, "freeze": their fitness is completely determined by the collective(s) they belong to:
is the same for all i conditional independence between two latent variables, e.g., I and C 2 , P (I|C 1 , C 2 , . . . ) = P (I|C 1 , . . . ) the composition of units at level C 1 is independent of what units they belong to at level C 2 . Bayesian structure learning evolutionary transitions in individuality
difference of average fitness of those units that are participating in the transition in individuality, causing the M a → M b change in population structure 
ship distribution of individuals (or lower level collectives), f (I i in C 1 j )/f (I i in any C 1 ).
156
These computations are illustrated by a toy example in Figure 2 . 
The critical conceptual identification here is therefore of (i) 169 the likelihood of the hypothesis parametrized by (I i , C 1 j , C 2 k , . . . ) and of (ii) the fitness 170 of those individuals I i that belong to those collectives C 1 j that belong to C 2 k , etc. The 
The first term in the sum describes the likelihood of the current parameters (i.e., their 233 ability to fit the data), whereas the second term weights these likelihoods according to 234 the prior probabilities of the parameters.
235
How evolution, on the other hand, limits the number of to-be-fitted parameters in any 
in which the first term in the sum corresponds to fitnesses of individuals according to 241 what collectives they belong to, and the second terms weights these fitnesses according represented as a new node in the Bayesian belief network. Then, another new collective emerges at level C 1 (the circles), therefore, the variable C 1 is renamed to C 1 as its possible values now include the circle as well. Finally, new collectives emerge at an even higher level (the rectangle and the ellipse at level C 2 ), and correspondingly, a new node is added to the network again. Note that the evolution of parameters (i.e., population composition in a fixed structure) is not illustrated here for simplicity.
toward a major evolutionary transition is MLS2. Note, that MLS1 can be understood as site for MLS2 to evolve. In general, compartmentalization itself (transient or not) is not 275 a sufficient property for a system to be a true evolutionary unit (cf. [31, 32] ).
276
Our framework allows for parameterization of collective fitnesses such that they only 277 depend on the collective's composition, therefore corresponding to multilevel selection 2. context, any such property corresponds to epigenetically inherited information that is not 288 coded by genes.
289
Let us conclude this section with some general remarks. First, in order to perform 290 explicit calculations, the fitness of each type at each level, i.e., P (e|I i , C 1 j , C 2 k , . . . ), has 291 to be specified. A natural way to do so is to pre-define a family of basis functions (e.g.,
292
Gaussians) on the space of possible environments e, parametrized by a set of parameters 293 (e.g., the mean and covariance of the Gaussian). Then, each type at each level is assigned 294 one member of the family through its parameters. What determines the fitness of a given 295 type at time t then is the value of the basis function assigned to that type at e(t). The Another key ingredient is that the stochastic environment determines the fitness of both 
